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Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a debilitating psychological condition 
characterized by intense fear in social-evaluative situations.  SAD is one of the most 
common psychological disorders, with a lifetime prevalence between 3% and 13% 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000), and it is associated with poor psychosocial, 
economical and health outcomes (Ghaedi, Tavoli, Bakhtiari, Melyani, & Sahragard, 
2010; Patel, Knapp, Henderson & Baldwin, 2002; Wittchen, Fuetsch, Sonntag, Müller, & 
Liebowitz, 2000).  Recent advances in the SAD literature have informed comprehensive 
cognitive theories of the development and maintenance of the disorder. Most components 
of cognitive models (e.g., attention, memory, interpretation) have been relatively well-
studied.  However, anticipatory processing, a component of Clark and Wells’ (1995) 
comprehensive cognitive model of SAD, has been somewhat ignored.  Therefore, the 
current study attempted to examine how anticipatory processing interacts with cognitive 
and emotional processes associated with SAD.   
Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that individuals with social anxiety engage in 
maladaptive cognitive behaviors prior to (e.g., anticipatory processing), during (e.g., self-
focused attention), and following (e.g., post-event rumination) a social situation.  Before 




could happen and shift their attention inward in order to intensely monitor their 
behaviors, physiology, and appearance.  This excessive internal attention limits external 
attention to signs of approval or disapproval from others, leaving individuals with only 
ambiguous information with which to evaluate the quality of the interaction.  As a result, 
these evaluations can be biased by the individual’s negative and distorted views of 
themselves.  Research has suggested that there is a relationship between attentional 
processes and social anxiety (e.g., Amir et al., 1996; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 
1996).  However, it is still unclear whether attention is biased toward internal information 
(e.g., their physiology, perceived appearance, and sound of their voices), external 
information (e.g., facial expressions and body language of other people), both (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; Schultz, 2009; Schultz & Heimberg, 2008), or if attentional biases 
represent avoidance away from threat (Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999).  Research 
on interpretation biases suggests that individuals with social anxiety endorse negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social stimuli at a disproportionately higher rate relative to 
non-anxious individuals (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Kanai, Sasagawa, Chen, Simada & 
Sakano, 2010).  However, other studies have found that SAD is better characterized by 
fewer positive interpretations of social stimuli (Hirsch & Mathews, 2000; Huppert, Foa, 
Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003).   
Inconsistencies in the cognitive bias literature underscore the importance of 
examining additional factors that may influence cognitive processes in SAD.  As Clark 
and Wells (1995) describe it, anticipatory processing precedes anxiety and self-focused 
attention.  Specifically, Clark and Wells (1995) described anticipatory processing as an 




happen in an upcoming social situation.  They also experience vivid images of past social 
failures (accurate or distorted), envision distorted perceptions of themselves, and/or 
imagine worst-case scenarios for the upcoming social situation.  These thoughts/images 
are intrusive and difficult to resist (Vassilopoulos, 2004).  As a result of these images, 
individuals with social anxiety begin to feel increasingly anxious, have difficulty 
concentrating, and shift their attention inward in order to better monitor their physical 
appearance and social behaviors (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
At present, only four studies have examined the specific effects of anticipatory 
processing on cognitive processes.  Broadly, research suggests that those who anticipate 
prior to social events tend to have memory biases toward self-referent words (Mansell & 
Clark, 1999), negative predictions of their appearance (Vassilopoulos, 2005), and higher 
standards for themselves (Wong & Moulds, 2011).  Studies also have found that those 
who anticipate have higher state anxiety (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 
2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005; Wong & Moulds, 2011) than those who do not.  Although 
these studies have found links between anticipatory processing and correlates of social 
anxiety, none of them appear to be direct tests of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, which 
suggests that anticipatory processing precedes increases in 1) anxiety, 2) self-focused 
attention, 3) negatively-biased interpretations of the event, and 4) avoidance.  All of these 
factors have been empirically implicated in the literature as mechanisms that maintain 
social anxiety, but no study has examined them simultaneously with anticipatory 
processing.  Furthermore, within this literature, the definition of anticipatory processing 
and the methodology used to study it have widely varied.  As a result, the body of 




Thus, the current study attempted to address this gap in the literature by 
simultaneously testing the components of Clark and Wells’ model (1995).  Participants 
high (HSA) and low (LSA) in social anxiety symptoms engaged in an anticipatory 
processing or a distraction thinking task prior to a social interaction in order to determine 
how the anticipation process affected anxiety, desire to avoid, focus of attention, and 
negative interpretations.  It was expected that those who anticipated would report higher 
levels of anxiety, have more desire to avoid the future social task, have higher internal 
attentional focus, and would endorse a higher level of negative interpretations of social 
events than those who engaged in distractive thinking.  Additionally, it was expected that 










 The initial pool of participants included 190 undergraduate students in psychology 
courses at a large Midwestern university.  Participants were recruited from the 
undergraduate psychology subject pool and were given extra credit for their participation 
in the study.  Forty-six participants did not exceed the cutoffs for HSA (SIAS score > 30) 
or LSA (SIAS score < 18) and were removed from analyses.  In order to ensure the LSA 
group represented a nonanxious, nondepressed sample, five LSA participants were 
removed for having elevated (> 1 SD; > 23 on the CES-D) depressive symptoms and 16 
LSA participants were removed for having elevated worry (> 61 on the PSWQ; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).  The final sample consisted of 66 LSA and 57 HSA 
participants (N = 123).  The sample was predominately female (72.4%), Caucasian 
(80.5%), and the mean age was 19.52 (SD = 3.3).  Additional participant information is 
presented in Table 1.  
Measures 
The following measures were completed by participants prior to the manipulation:  
Demographics (Appendix E).  Demographic information was collected from 
participants, including sex, age, ethnicity, year in school, high school and college GPA, 




 Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS); 
Mattick & Clarke, 1998; Appendix F).  The SIAS and SPS are complimentary 20-item 
self-report questionnaires that measure social anxiety symptoms.  The SIAS is primarily 
focused on the severity of fears of general social interactions (e.g., “I become tense if I 
have to talk about myself or my feelings”) and the SPS is primarily focused on anxiety 
related to social performance situations (e.g., giving a speech, using a public bathroom, 
etc.).  Responses for both scales are rated on a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (Not at 
all characteristic or true of me) to 4 (Extremely characteristic or true of me) with total 
scores ranging from 0 to 80.  Both instruments correlate with other measures of social 
anxiety and can distinguish between individuals with social anxiety disorder, specific 
phobia, and agoraphobia (Mattick & Clarke, 1998).  The SIAS (α = .94) and SPS (α = 
.94) have been shown to have good internal consistency (Mattick & Clarke, 1998).  In the 
current study, internal consistency of the SIAS (α = .95) and SPS (α = .94) were both 
strong.  
Anticipatory Social Behaviours Questionnaire (ASBQ; Hinrichsen & Clark, 
2003; Appendix G).  The ASBQ is a 12-item measure which assesses cognitive 
strategies used by individuals prior to social situations, including rehearsal for the 
upcoming situation, catastrophizing, and thinking about past social situations.  The 
ASBQ was developed from items that distinguished individuals with high social anxiety 
from those with low social anxiety.  Items include “I imagine the worst that could 
happen,” “I try to picture how I will appear to others,” and “I think about similar 
situations in which I have failed in the past.”  Each item is rated on a 1 (Never) to 4 




The internal consistency of the ASBQ is high ( = .88; Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003).  In 
the current study, the reliability of the ASBQ was high ( = .91). 
Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977; Appendix H).  The CES-D is a 20-item self-report questionnaire which measures 
the severity of depressive symptoms during the previous week.  Responses range from 0 
(Rarely or none of the time) to 3 (Most or all of the time).  Total scores range from 0 to 
60, with higher scores indicating more severe depressive symptoms.  Research has 
demonstrated that the CES-D has good internal consistency ( = .85 for general 
population and .90 for clinical sample), modest test-retest reliability (8 weeks; r = .57), 
and can be used with clinical and non-clinical samples (Locke & Putnam, 1971).  The 
internal consistency of the CES-D in the current study was high ( = .90).  
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ;  Meyer et al., 1990; Appendix I).  
The PSWQ is a 16-item questionnaire that assesses the extent to which the participant 
worries about various situations.  Items are scored on a 1 (Not at all typical) to 5 (Very 
typical) scale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of worry.  The PSWQ has 
excellent internal consistency ( = .95) and test-retest reliability (8 to 10 weeks; r = .92; 
Meyer et al., 1990).  In the current study, the internal consistency of the PSWQ was high 
( = .95).  
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; 
Treynor et al., 2003; Appendix J).  This revised measure contains 10 of the original 
items and assesses the frequency of ruminative thoughts.  The revised RRS has 




study, the measure was adapted to assess rumination following social situations.  Internal 
consistency of this version of the RRS was high ( = .89). 
Subjective Anxiety Level (Appendix K).  Participants were asked to report a 
baseline current anxiety level ranging from 0 (No anxiety at all) to 100 (The worst 
anxiety I have ever felt).  
 The following measures were completed by participants after the manipulation:  
Manipulation check (Appendix L).  In order to assess whether participants were 
engaging in the instructed behaviors during the manipulation period, they were given a 
manipulation check questionnaire that asked them to 1) describe what they thought about 
during the manipulation, 2) estimate the percentage of time during the manipulation that 
they were following the prompts on the screen (0% - 100%), 3) estimate the time during 
the manipulation they spent thinking about the social interaction (0% - 100%), 4) 
estimate the degree to which they typically think about the stimuli in the prompts (on an 
11-point scale ranging from “never” to “many times a day”), and 5) record the vividness 
of the imagery they experienced while thinking about the prompts (on an 7-point scale 
ranging from “no image present at all” to “perfectly clear and as vivid as the actual 
experience”).   
Subjective anxiety level (Appendix M).  Participants were asked to provide their 
anxiety level immediately prior to the social interaction using the same 0 to 100 scale that 
was used prior to the manipulation.   
Behavioral avoidance (Appendix M).  Participants were asked three questions to 
assess their desire to avoid the upcoming social interaction.  The first question assessed 




in the social interaction, which was conceptualized as avoidance at a low cost (e.g., they 
do not have to sacrifice a lot to get out of the interaction).  The second avoidance 
question asked them to what degree they would be willing to sacrifice one-half of their 
extra credit points in order to skip the social interaction.  This question attempted to 
assess whether or not they would make a substantial sacrifice in order to avoid the 
interaction.  Both of these questions are scored on a 0 (Definitely no) to 10 (Definitely 
yes) scale.  The final question assessed their overall desire to engage in the interaction on 
a scale ranging from 0 (I do not want to do it at all) to 10 (I am excited for it).  
Focus of Attention Questionnaire (FAQ; adapted from Woody, 1996; 
Appendix N).  The FAQ is a 10-item questionnaire designed to assess the stimuli on 
which an individual is focusing during a speech task.  The FAQ has a subscale that 
measures an individual’s level of focus on his or her own thoughts, anxiety, behavior, and 
physiology (Self-Focus) and a subscale that measures an individual’s level of focus on 
the social partner and/or the environment (Other-Focus).  The FAQ was originally 
developed for participants to fill out after a speech task has been completed.  However, in 
the current study, participants filled out the measure before a social task.  Therefore, 
minor changes were made to the wording of items in order to adapt it for a future social 
interaction.  For example, the item “I was focusing on the impression I was making on 
the other person” was changed to “I am focusing on the impression I am going to make 
on my interaction partner and/or the researchers.”  Internal consistency for the subscales 
in the FAQ in its original form was modest for both scales (Self-Focus  = .76, Other-
Focus  = .72).  In the current study, the reliability for the Self-Focus scale was modest 




Self-Report Measure of Interpretation Bias (SMIB; Huppert, Pasupuleti, 
Foa, & Mathews, 2007; Appendix O).  The SMIB is a 32-item questionnaire that asks 
participants to rate how likely specific outcomes are in various social situations.  There 
are 16 social situations in the questionnaire; each situation ends with a positive outcome 
or a negative outcome, and participants are instructed to rate the likelihood of each on a 0 
(Not likely at all) to 10 (Definitely likely) scale.  For example, the phrase “Your 
supervisor calls you into her office to tell you that you did something…” ends with 
“awful” at one point in the questionnaire and “impressive” at another point.  The positive 
items had adequate reliability ( = .69), but the negative items (the focus of this study) 
had excellent reliability ( = .93; Huppert et al., 2007).  In the current study, the 
reliability of the Positive Interpretation scale was adequate ( = .81) and the reliability of 
the Negative Interpretation Scale was good ( = .90).  
 Belief in Interaction.  After participants were informed there was not going to be 
a social interaction, they were asked to rate how much they believed a social interaction 
was actually going to take place in this study.  This rating ranged from 0 (I was 
completely convinced there would not be an interaction) to 10 (I was completely 
convinced there would be an interaction).  
Procedure   
Participants were recruited from the university’s subject pool system.  The SPS, 
as part of a larger project (Grant, et al., in preparation), was used in order to recruit 
subjects.  Subjects high (> 30) and low (< 18) in SPS scores were invited to participate in 
a study about thoughts and emotions during anxious situations.  After recruitment, the 




assesses social interaction anxiety, which was more consistent with the nature of the 
social threat used in the procedure.  The cutoff score for HSA individuals was determined 
by calculating 1 standard deviation above the mean SIAS score for nonclinical 
undergraduate students (M = 19.0, SD = 10.1) reported in Mattick and Clarke (1998).  
Therefore, HSA individuals were defined by a score of 30 or higher on the SIAS.  LSA 
individuals are defined by having a score below the mean from Mattick and Clarke 
(1998; 18 or lower).   
Participants were randomly assigned to either the Anticipation or Distraction 
condition using a random number generator.  Next, they completed trait measures 
(demographics, SIAS, ASBQ, CES-D, PSWQ, RRS, and Time 1 [Baseline] Subjective 
Anxiety) on www.kwiksurveys.com, an online questionnaire site.  After completing the 
initial measures, researchers told participants that they will be engaging in a social 
interaction with a research assistant.  The researcher told participants that the interaction 
will be filmed with a video camera, and the tape would be viewed by other researchers at 
a later time.  A social interaction task was used in this study instead of a speech task 
because an interaction task realistically simulates anxiety-provoking situations that 
individuals with social anxiety encounter daily.  Similar instructions have been found to 
elicit moderate, but not overwhelmingly high, levels of anxiety in participants (e.g., Beck, 
Davila, Farrow, & Grant, 2006).  
Then, the researcher told the participant that the social interaction would begin in 
about ten minutes, but in the meantime, the participant was instructed to prepare for the 
interaction by following video thinking prompts.  Participants viewed a 4 minute, 45 




Each prompt was presented individually for 45 seconds.  In the Anticipation condition, 
participants viewed the six anticipation instructions developed by Hinrichsen and Clark 
(2003; Appendix C).  In the Distraction condition, participants viewed six of the neutral 
stimuli used in Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s (1993) rumination paradigm (Appendix 
D).  Everything related to the presentation of the prompts (e.g., color of the webpage, 
time of presentation, total time of task) was identical except the content of the prompts.  
 After the manipulation, the researcher told the participant to fill out additional 
questionnaires (i.e. Manipulation Check, SMIB, FAQ, Time 2 Anxiety, and Avoidance) 
before the interaction started.  When the participant completed those questionnaires, they 
were informed that there would not be a social interaction.  They were debriefed and 
informed that they were free to leave.  
Hypotheses 
Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that anticipatory processing could potentially-
result in increased anxiety, avoidance, self-focused attention, and/or negative 
interpretations, and Hinrichsen and Clark (2003) found that anticipatory processing 
influences both HSA and LSA individuals.  Therefore, we expected that those in the 
Anticipation condition would have higher mean scores for each of those variables, and 
we expected a significant interaction such that the effect would more pronounced for 
HSA participants (Figure 1).  In other words, we expected anticipation to affect all 
participants, but we also expected it to especially affect HSA participants (Figure 1).  
Similarly, we expected lower mean scores for positive interpretations for those in the 
Anticipation condition, especially for HSA participants.  Finally, we expected a mean 












Assumptions.  No variables violated assumptions of skewness > |2.0| (all < |1.74| 
for high-cost avoidance) or kurtosis > |4.0| (all < |2.59| for high-cost avoidance).  No 
values exceeded z > 
+
/- |3.29| on any variable for any participant (all < |3.01| for Other-
Focused attention; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Several DVs (high-cost avoidance, 
internal attention, external attention, negative interpretation biases, vividness of imagery, 
degree of belief in the upcoming interaction, degree to which they think about the stimuli 
in the prompts in a given day) had significant Levene’s tests for heterogeneity of 
variances.  However, because Levene’s test can be too sensitive (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007) and cell sample sizes were relatively equal (largest cell : smallest cell = 65:53 = 
1.2), only Fmax values exceeding 10 represented areas of concern (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007).  All Fmax values were equal to or less than 5.09 (high-cost avoidance).  Therefore, 
the analyses were robust to violations of homogeneity of variance and we examined 
unadjusted F values.  
Participant characteristics.  Those assigned to the Anticipation condition (N = 
54) did not differ from those in the Distraction condition (N = 69) on trait social 
interaction anxiety symptoms (p = .22), worry (p = .27), anticipatory processing (p = .47), 




proportionally represented in SA groups, χ
2
(1) = .50, p = .48.  Additional participant 
information is presented in Table 1.  
 Group Assignment.  HSA and LSA participants were proportionally assigned to 
each condition, χ
2
(1) = 1.18, p = .28.  Men and women also were proportionally assigned 
to each condition, χ
2
(1) = .54, p = .46. 
Manipulation Check.  One-hundred percent of the participants endorsed that 
they understood the directions for the manipulation.  After the manipulation, participants 
were asked to describe what they were doing during the manipulation.  If participants 
explicitly described that they were thinking about the prompts, they were coded as “On 
Task.”  Approximately 91% of participants were coded as On Task, and there were no 
differences between Condition (p = .75) or SA Group (p = 1.00).  Overall, participants 
estimated that they were thinking about the prompts for 65.3% (SD = 23.74%) and the 
social interaction for 33.2% (SD = 28.48%) of the manipulation.  These values are 
consistent with similar studies (e.g., Behar, Vescio, Borkovec, 2005; McLaughlin, 
Borkovec, & Sibrava; 2007).  Those in the Anticipation condition thought about the 
upcoming social interaction more (M = 50.28%, SD = 27.27%) than those in the 
Distraction condition (M = 19.71%, SD = 21.37%), primarily because those in the 
Anticipation group were specifically instructed to think about the upcoming interaction, 
F(1, 118) = 46.48, p < .001.  There were no differences between HSA and LSA 
individuals in percentage thinking about the interaction (p = .98).  HSA in the 
Anticipation condition reported that they typically think about the material in the prompts 
more often (M = 4.07, SD = 1.76) than LSA in the Anticipate condition (M = 1.96, SD = 




commonly experienced by HSA than LSA individuals.  Finally, the Distraction group 
experienced more vivid imagery (M = 5.56, SD = .98) than the Anticipation group (M = 
4.57, SD = 1.17), but a significant interaction (F[1, 118] = 6.85, p = .01) found that HSA 
in the Anticipation condition (M = 4.96, SD = 1.62) experienced more vivid imagery than 
LSA in the Anticipation condition (M = 4.15, SD = 1.74; p = .03), whereas HSA and LSA 
experienced equal vividness of imagery in the Distract condition (p = .33).  This suggests 
HSA individuals do not experience more vivid imagery overall, but they do for social 
information during anticipatory processing.   
 Overall, participants appeared to believe that an interaction was going to take 
place (M = 8.67, SD = 1.97).  There were no differences between those in different 
conditions (p = .11; η
2
 = .02), nor was there a significant Condition X SA Group 
interaction (p = .36; η
2
 = .01).  However, LSA individuals had higher belief that the 
interaction was going to take place (M = 9.05, SD = 1.55) than HSA individuals (M = 
8.23, SD = 2.31), F(1, 118) = 5.61, p = .01, η
2
 = .05.  A small (N = 15) pilot study (Grant, 
Lechner, Mills, & Judah, in preparation) found that those who had completed self-report 
questionnaires assessing anxiety, depression, and cognitive processes had equal scores on 
measures of trait anticipatory processing (p = .83), positive affect (p = .47),and negative 
affect (p = .59) than those who did not fill out questionnaires.  
 Anxiety.  There were no differences in mean post-manipulation subjective 
anxiety levels between the Anticipation (M = 36.30, SD = 25.5) and Distraction (M = 
36.69, SD = 26.50) conditions (F[1, 114] = .46, p = .50), nor was there a significant 




= 23.51) had significantly higher post-manipulation anxiety than LSA individuals (M = 
24.36, SD = 21.38), F(1, 114) = 41.18, p < .001, η
2
 = .27.  
 There was no overall increase in self-reported anxiety from Time 1 (Baseline; M 
= 36.42, SD = 27.69) to Time 2 (Post-Manipulation; M = 36.52, SD = 25.95), F(1, 114) = 
.01, p = .93 (Figure 4).  There were no Time X Condition, Time X SA Group, or Time X 
SA Group X SA Group interactions.  
 Avoidance.  Those in the Anticipation condition (M = 6.26, SD = 3.12) had more 
desire to fill out questionnaires instead of participate in the social interaction than the 
Distraction group (M = 4.91, SD = 3.04), F(1, 119) = 4.48, p = .04, η
2
 = .04 (Figure 5).  
Those in the Anticipation condition (M = 4.46, SD = 2.10) also had slightly less desire to 
engage in the social interaction overall than the Distraction group (M = 5.28, SD = 2.03), 
but this effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 119) = 3.61, p = .06, η
2
 = .03 (Figure 
6).  There was no effect of condition on overt avoidance (accepting ½ credit in order to 
avoid the interaction; p = .27; Figure 7).  HSA individuals had more desire to avoid by 
filling out questionnaires (F[1, 119] = 20.64, p < .001, η
2
 = .15), more desire to avoid by 
taking ½ credit (F[1, 119] = 21.85, p < .001, η
2
 = .16), and less desire to engage in the 
interaction (F[1, 119] = 34.97, p < .001, η
2
 = .23) than LSA participants. There were no 
significant Condition X SA Group interactions for these analyses. 
 Focus of Attention.  There was a significant Condition X SA Group interaction 
(F[1, 119] = 5.56, p = .02, η
2
 = .05) such that HSA in the Anticipation condition had 
significantly higher Self-Focus scores (M = 14.86, SD = 3.64) than HSA in the Distract 
condition (M = 12.72, SD = 4.23; p = .02), but there were no differences between LSA 




Other-Focus, but this interaction was only marginally significant (F[1, 119] = 3.43, p = 
.07, η
2
 = .06; Figure 9).  HSA individuals had higher Self-Focus (F[1, 119] = 52.25, p < 
.001, η
2
 = 31) and Other-Focus (F[1, 119] = 7.69, p = .01, η
2
 = .06) scores than LSA 
individuals.  There were no main effects of Condition for Self-Focus (p = .31) or Other- 
Focus (p = .45) scores.  
 Interpretation.  Those in the Anticipation condition had slightly higher mean 
Negative Interpretation scores (M = 56.63, SD = 27.11) than those in the Distraction 
condition (M = 47.74, SD = 20.90), but this effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 
119) = 3.28, p = .07, η
2
 = .03 (Figure 10).  There were no differences between 
Anticipation and Distraction for Positive Interpretations (p = .62), nor were there 
significant Condition X SA Group interactions for Negative or Positive Interpretations.  
HSA individuals had higher Negative Interpretation scores (F[1,119] = 71.26, p < .001, 
η
2
 = .38) and lower Positive Interpretation scores than LSA individuals (F[1, 119] = 
28.99, p < .001, η
2








 The purpose of the current study was to examine the effect of anticipatory 
processing on anxiety, avoidance, interpretation, and attentional focus, all of which are 
factors that are hypothesized by Clark and Wells (1995) to maintain symptoms of SAD.  
Consistent with our expectations, the results of this study suggested that engaging in 
anticipatory processing increased an individual’s desire to avoid the interaction and 
potentially can result in higher endorsement of negative interpretations of social events, 
although the latter result was marginally significant.  Contrary to our hypotheses, these 
effects were not more pronounced for HSA individuals.  We also found that HSA 
individuals who engaged in anticipation were more internally-focused and were 
potentially more externally-focused, although the latter result was marginally significant 
and based on a subscale with poor reliability.  Although we expected to see the effect for 
internal self-focus, we did not expect that anticipation would increase external attention 
as well.  Finally, contrary to our hypotheses, anticipatory processing did not result in 
increased anxiety after baseline and those who anticipated did not have higher anxiety 
than those in the distraction group prior to the interaction.  Taken together, these results 
seem to offer some support for the Clark and Wells (1995) model that suggested 




 the current study was not able to replicate previous findings that anticipation resulted in 
an increase in anxiety.  
 Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that anticipatory processing results in an increase 
in self-focused attention in socially-anxious individuals.  The current study supports this 
hypothesis.  However, we also found a potential difference in externally-focused 
attention for those who anticipated (although this finding should be interpreted with 
caution).  If this finding is replicated in future research, this would be most consistent 
with Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive model of social anxiety, which suggested 
that HSA individuals show increased attention toward threatening (external) stimuli in 
addition to increased internal/self-focused attention.  The influence of anticipatory 
processing may not be the solitary factor that could elucidate the research on attentional 
biases in social anxiety.  However, future research should continue to examine the effects 
of anticipation on attentional processes in order to better understand the mechanisms 
associated with attentional biases, especially if anticipatory processing is consistently 
found to precede attentional biases.  
Previous research on socially-anxious individuals has concluded that they 
evaluate neutral social events as negative (Kanai, Sasagawa, Chen, Simada, & Sakano, 
2010; Stopa & Clark, 2010) and exaggerate the catastrophic nature of negative social 
interactions (Stopa & Clark, 2010).  The current study found that anticipation potentially 
resulted in more endorsement of negative interpretations, although this effect was 
marginally significant.  This raises the possibility that the degree to which an individual 
engages in anticipatory processing may influence their tendency to engage in negative 




situation expecting the worst are more likely to perceive evidence that confirms those 
expectations.  This finding also expanded on Hinrichsen and Clark (2003), which 
suggested LSA individuals can experience negative effects of anticipatory processing as 
well.  Future research should examine the effects of anticipatory processing on 
interpretations of social behaviors (e.g., Kanai et al., 2010) and attempt to further 
examine the relationship between anticipation and interpretation.  
This study also found that those who anticipated, regardless of social anxiety 
status, expressed more desire to avoid the social interaction.  However, this finding was 
specific to low-cost avoidance (filling out questionnaires) and not to high-cost avoidance 
(sacrificing research credits).  Participants who anticipated also were less enthusiastic 
about the social interaction.   
Finally, this study did not replicate the rather-consistent findings of previous 
studies on anticipatory processing that anticipation results in an increase in (or lack of 
attenuation of) anxiety.  It is possible that this lack of finding is more related to 
methodology than theory.  Some studies have noted that anticipatory processing affects 
subjective anxiety (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003), whereas others have found that 
anticipatory processing increases anxiety using physiological measures (e.g., skin 
conductance; Wong & Moulds, 2011) and well-validated measures of state anxiety (e.g., 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State version; Mellings & Alden, 2000).  Therefore, future 
studies should utilize multi-method assessment of anxiety in order to determine the 





 One limitation of this study was the use of self-report measures in order to study 
the constructs of interest.  However, due to the exploratory nature of this study, the use of 
self-report measures allowed the researchers to examine a wide variety of constructs in a 
relatively short time (approximately 5 minutes).  Future research should examine each of 
these constructs, along with others, using multi-method paradigms.  For example, future 
studies could induce anticipatory processing and then have participants complete a dot-
probe task in order to assess for attentional biases.  
 Another limitation was the use of an undergraduate sample.  Although HSA 
participants did not receive a full assessment for SAD, the current sample of HSA 
individuals scored similarly to clinical samples on common measures of social anxiety 
symptoms (Mattick & Clarke, 1998).  Similarly, SAD is relatively common in 
undergraduates (American College Health Association, 2008), which suggests this 
sample may have been adequately representative of the socially-anxious population. 
 The cross-sectional design in the current study provided the researchers 
information about a particular moment in time, but prospective studies would increase 
our understanding of the development of social anxiety symptoms and cognitive 
processes.  For example, a prospective design could provide researchers with information 
about whether an individual’s tendency to engage in anticipatory processing is a risk 
factor for developing SA symptoms or if the onset of SA symptoms results in an increase 
in anticipatory processing.  
Future Directions 
Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that anticipatory processing and other processes 




study did not examine this, but future research should examine the effects of anticipatory 
processing on social performance.  Three studies have attempted to explore this 
possibility (e.g., Brown & Stopa, 2006; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Wong & Moulds, 
2011).  None have found evidence that anticipation directly relates to decreased 
performance, but it is possible that anticipatory processing activates other mechanisms 
(e.g., anxiety, interpretation biases, desire to avoid) that may more directly result in social 
performance deficits.  Wong and Moulds (2011) found that anticipation indirectly 
interfered with social performance through anxiety, supporting the interactive nature of 
these processes as suggested by Clark and Wells.  The current study found a relationship 
between each of those variables except anxiety, but prior research suggests that this study 
was the exception with regards to that relationship.  Therefore, although each of these 
variables was examined independently in the current study, future research should 
examine the interactions of these constructs and other potential maintaining factors of 
SAD.  The Clark and Wells (1995) model does not explicitly hypothesize about the 
sequence of the constructs in the model.  However, it is very likely that cognitive biases 
are influenced by each other and by anxious arousal, and prospective designs can attempt 
to examine this process in a larger context instead of examining one process at a time.  
Similarly, future research should also examine the relationship between anticipatory 
processing and other constructs of negative repetitive thinking, such as worry, 
rumination, and post-event processing.  Early research in this area is promising.  For 
example, Grant and Beck (2010) demonstrated that an individual’s trait level of 




The current study suggests that anticipatory processing plays an important role in 
the larger cognitive model of social anxiety proposed by Clark and Wells (1995).  
Research should continue to examine the relationship between anticipatory processing 
and the constructs in the current study and examine how they interact to maintain social 
anxiety symptoms.  If anticipatory processing directly influences processes that maintain 
social anxiety, interventions focused on reducing anticipation may prevent anxiety or 
cognitive biases from developing.  This information may be vital to improve our 
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75.4% 69.7% .50 
 
79.6% 66.7% 2.55 
Sex (% 
male) 
24.6% 30.3% .50 
 
20.4% 33.3% 2.55 
Caucasian 82.5% 78.8% .26  79.6% 81.2% .05 
Non-
Caucasian 
17.5% 21.2% .26 
 
20.4% 18.8% .05 
Note: SIAS assessed social anxiety, CES-D assessed depression, ASBQ assessed 
anticipatory processing, PSWQ assessed worry, RRS assessed rumination.  * p < 





Figure 1.  Hypothesized pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 
(Condition: Anticipate, Distract) between-groups ANOVA for self-focused attention, 





Figure 2.  Hypothesized pattern of results for the 2 (Time: Baseline, Interaction) by 2 









Figure 3.  Pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 (Condition: 






Figure 4.  Pattern of results for the 2 (Time: Baseline, Interaction) by 2 (Condition: 
















Figure 5   Pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 (Condition: 






Figure 6.  Pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 (Condition: 






Figure 7.  Pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 (Condition: 






Figure 8. Pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 (Condition: Anticipate, 







Figure 9.  Pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 (Condition: 







Figure 10.  Pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 (Condition: 







Figure 11.  Pattern of results for the 2 (SA Group: HSA, LSA) by 2 (Condition: 





REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Social Anxiety Disorder 
 Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a psychological condition characterized by 
unreasonable anxiety that is cued by situations involving social interaction (e.g., speaking 
with a stranger) or social performance (e.g., giving a speech).  The core fear of SAD is 
exposure to situations in which one is being evaluated by others.  In order to be eligible 
for a diagnosis of SAD in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR], 2000), an individual needs to 
meet the following criteria: A) a marked fear of situations in which the individual is 
exposed to unfamiliar people or evaluative situations, B) anxiety when exposed to such 
feared social situations, C) acknowledgement that the fear is excessive or unreasonable, 
D) avoidance of such situations (or anxious endurance when avoidance is not possible), 
and E) significant impairment caused by the avoidance, anxiety, or distress related to the 
feared social situations.  
 According to DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000), the lifetime prevalence of SAD is 
between 3% and 13%, which makes it one of the most common anxiety disorders.  SAD 
typically develops in adolescence and may be more common in women than men (DSM-
IV-TR, 2000).  SAD has a particularly high level of comorbidity with other anxiety and 




for another Axis I disorder (Merikangas & Angst, 1995), with the most common 
comorbid disorders being another anxiety disorder (59%; Kessler et al., 2003) or major 
depressive disorder (20%; Merikangas & Angst, 1995; Ohayon & Schatzberg, 2010).  
Because social interactions occur multiple times a day in a variety of contexts, SAD can 
become particularly debilitating and impairing.  For example, individuals with SAD 
report lower overall quality of life, lower levels of social functioning and satisfaction, 
poorer mental health functioning, and lower ratings of physical health (Ghaedi, Tavoli, 
Bakhtiari, Melyani, & Sahragard, 2010; Wittchen, Fuetsch, Sonntag, Müller, & 
Liebowitz, 2000).  Other research suggests that individuals with social anxiety have 
lower rates of employment, lower work productivity, lower socioeconomic status, have 
lower household income, and higher levels of drug dependency than individuals without 
a psychological disorder (Patel, Knapp, Henderson & Baldwin, 2002; Wittchen et al., 
2000).  Due to the high prevalence rate, the high comorbidity rate, the high frequency 
with which social interactions occur, and the significant impairment associated with 
SAD, research on the disorder has greatly increased in recent years, and theories from a 
variety of perspectives have emerged to explain the development and maintenance of the 
disorder.  
Theories of Social Anxiety 
 The following is a brief overview of various theories related to the development 
and maintenance of SAD.  Although the theories are presented below in separate 
sections, the most well-accepted and supported models of SAD integrate elements from 
many of these perspectives.  




variety of ways for phobic anxiety to be learned.  Classical fear-acquisition models (e.g., 
Watson, & Rayner, 1920) and even more recent studies have supported a direct 
conditioning model in which a traumatic experience serves as the impetus for the 
development of a phobia.  Öst and Hugdahl (1981) found 58% of participants with social 
phobia identified a traumatic conditioning experience as a cause for their social anxiety, 
and these results were replicated in a later study (56%; Öst, 1985).  Harvey, Ehlers, and 
Clark (2005) found that individuals with social anxiety self-reported that direct 
conditioning experiences were only somewhat influential in developing SAD.  Instead, 
they attributed their symptoms to shyness, lack of social skill training, and genetics.  
However, the same sample reported that their social fears began to develop at the same 
time as many social stressors, including being introduced into new social groups, 
experiencing problems with peer groups, receiving criticism, or being ostracized from a 
social group.  Therefore, the Harvey et al. (2005) participants appear to be either poor 
reporters of the etiology of their symptoms, or they considered other factors (e.g., lack of 
skills, being shy) as being more influential in the development of their disorder.  
Recently, more attention has been given to vicarious or observational learning, in 
which the phobic individual develops a phobia by observing another person’s fears to 
particular stimuli or by hearing information about why they should fear a particular 
stimulus.  Öst (1985) reported that around 18% of participants attributed their social 
anxiety symptoms to modeling or from receiving information from others.  This 
additional perspective adds to the validity of the behavioral perspective because a 
significant proportion of individuals with phobias do not attribute the development of 




Although the behavioral perspective has received solid empirical support, there 
are still limitations.  Primarily, although conditioning appears to be related to the 
development of SAD, not everyone with SAD reports a conditioning experience, and not 
everyone who experiences (or witnesses) traumatic social situations develops SAD.  
Therefore, there must be other factors that explain how some people develop the disorder 
and others do not.  
Additionally, typical conditioning history research relies on self-report from 
individuals who are notoriously susceptible to memory and interpretive biases (e.g., Amir 
& Foa, 2001).  In other words, people with anxiety disorders are likely not the most 
accurate reporters of their anxiety histories because of their increased vulnerability to 
cognitive distortions and biases.  As research has progressed, more models of anxiety 
have evolved to supplement conditioning models with biological, affective, interpersonal, 
and cognitive theories.  Together, these perspectives have created an integrative model of 
SAD.  Some of said models are further discussed below.  
Evolutionary.  The evolutionary model of social anxiety is an extension of the 
preparedness concept of anxiety disorders.  Seligman (1971) noted that while fear can be 
acquired and extinguished quite easily in the laboratory, it is more difficult to extinguish 
phobias in the naturalistic world.  He argued that this is the case because humans are 
innately prepared to learn to fear certain objects.  This preparedness is evolutionarily 
adaptive, as fear serves the function of protecting humans from potential harm.  This 
notion is supported in the literature.  For example, Öhman and Mineka (2001) reviewed a 
variety of research that found that both humans and other primates more easily acquire 




unintuitively threatening stimuly (e.g., plants).  This suggests that primates and humans 
are hard-wired to acquire fear for stimuli that have an evolutionary history of causing 
harm.   
Öhman, Dinberg, and Öst (1985) extended the idea of preparedness to include 
social phobia.  They argued that social fears are rooted in the desire to maintain social 
dominance hierarchies and membership in social groups.  In other words, instead of 
experiencing an exaggerated fear response toward stimuli that could lead to physical 
harm (e.g., spiders, heights, germs), individuals with social anxiety fear situations that 
involve negative evaluation from others.  Whereas animal fear (and other similar 
phobias) facilitates escape as the primary means to short-term survival, the function of 
social fear appears to serve a dual purpose of submission to social threat while 
simultaneously maintaining group membership, thus increasing the probability of 
continued group membership and long-term survival (Öhman, 2009).   
Interpersonal.  The interpersonal model of social anxiety suggests that social 
interactions that occur early in development shape interpersonal patterns later on in life, 
and an individual’s sense of self develops primarily based on how others react to them 
(Alden & Taylor, 2010; Meleshko & Alden, 1993).  Alden and Taylor (2010) suggested 
that individuals with social anxiety are timid and socially-avoidant in childhood, which 
potentially increases the probability of negative social experiences.  These negative 
experiences shape their interpersonal styles and senses of self.  Due to their impaired 
ability to form close relationships, socially-anxious individuals feel the need to remain 
close to others while simultaneously attempting to avoid rejection or negative evaluation 




perceive the potential for negative evaluation, they strategically engage in behaviors that 
attempt to maintain interpersonal closeness (Alden & Taylor, 2010).  However, because 
individuals with social anxiety assume that their true self is undesirable, the behaviors 
they choose are typically self-protective, such as avoiding emotional expression, avoiding 
conflict, being unassertive, and engaging in excessive interpersonal dependency (Davila 
& Beck, 2002).  These behaviors tend to inhibit interpersonal closeness instead of 
fostering it, which maintains the cycle of dysfunctional interpersonal interactions (Alden 
& Taylor, 2010).  
 For example, research has shown that in order to protect themselves, socially-
anxious individuals will minimize disclosure, restrict emotional expression, and increase 
their focus on their own physiology and emotions during social interactions (Alden, 
2001).  The anxious individual believes these behaviors reduce the risk of negative 
evaluation because they feel that the less others know about them, the less others can 
negatively evaluate them.  However, to others, the socially-anxious individual appears 
indifferent and/or disinterested, which leads to negative evaluation.  Specifically, 
research has found that shy individuals are rated negatively on a variety of dimensions by 
friends and strangers.  For example, studies have found that shy and/or socially-anxious 
individuals are rated lower than their nonanxious counterparts on likability, 
attractiveness, assertiveness, warmth, and friendliness.  Socially-anxious individuals also 
are rated as more anxious, more sensitive to demands, more self-pitying, and more 
moody (Alden & Wallace, 1995; Creed & Funder, 1998; Heerey & Kring, 2007; 




 According to this model, social anxiety is maintained because the socially-
anxious individual continues to use the self-protective interpersonal style in new social 
situations.  As a result, others feel that the socially-anxious individual is too distant and 
dissimilar to them, and they no longer want to pursue the relationship (Alden & Taylor, 
2010).  
Cognitive.  Instead of conceptualizing a standalone perspective, cognitive 
theories, such as Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997), built on 
elements from the behavioral and interpersonal approaches.  Research on cognitive 
theories of anxiety has demonstrated that anxiety is associated with attentional biases 
toward threat stimuli, negative interpretations of stimuli, and memory biases toward 
threat-related information (Amir & Foa, 2001; Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Ledley & 
Heimberg, 2006).  At normal levels, each of these cognitive processes is evolutionarily 
adaptive; if a stimulus is threatening, it is beneficial for the individual to be able to 
quickly notice the stimulus and identify it as threatening.  It also is beneficial for the 
individual to encode information about the threatening stimulus into long-term memory 
so that future encounters with the stimulus can be processed more quickly.  When 
individuals with social anxiety perceive that they are in evaluative situations, they react to 
the situation by engaging in safety behaviors (e.g., restricting the expression of emotion, 
intensely self-monitoring, drinking alcohol to loosen up) or escaping/avoiding (e.g., 
cancelling social plans, spending time isolated at a party) the threatening situation, and 
their anxiety eventually decreases.  To the individual, the decrease in anxiety, which is a 
positive outcome, is attributed to their preparative cognitive and safety behaviors, and 




behaviors and/or cognitive preparation and avoided the catastrophic outcome that they 
believed would occur, which increases the use of said behavior.  However, in reality, the 
high-anxiety individual was never in actual danger, and the probability of the catastrophic 
outcome was minimal.  In the end, the high-anxiety individual learned that the danger is 
real and that avoidance makes them feel better, thus maintaining their anxiety symptoms.  
Primary Cognitive Models and Their Components 
Researchers have implemented these biases and other cognitive behaviors into 
integrative cognitive models.  The two primary cognitive models of social phobia were 
proposed by Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997), and both models 
were fundamentally similar.  The core component of each model is that individuals with 
social phobia create mental representations of how they appear to others, and they assume 
that these representations accurately portray how others see them.  The individual with 
social anxiety puts significant credence into this self-perception, even when confronted 
with observable disconfirmatory evidence from others.  For example, if an individual 
feels that he is giving a boring speech, yet the audience appears engaged and interested, 
he may conclude that the audience only looks interested in order to make him feel better, 
because they can tell he is nervous and unprepared.  
The Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) models both 
discussed cognitive distortions such as dysfunctional beliefs, attentional biases, memory 
biases and interpretation biases.  Below is a discussion about each concept in the context 
of the two models, as well as evidence of support of each concept from more recent 
literature.  In both models, these components are hypothesized to interact with each other 




behaviors and anticipatory processing, which only appear in the Clark and Wells (1995) 
model.   
Dysfunctional beliefs.  Both models identify a number of dysfunctional beliefs 
that individuals with social anxiety report having about themselves and others.  
Individuals with social anxiety assume that other people are naturally critical, hold 
consistently high standards, are constantly judging them, and any perceived unacceptable 
behavior will be met with rejection from others (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Turk, Lerner, 
Heimberg, & Rapee, 2000).  They also believe that everyone must like them, and in order 
to achieve this, they must not show any weaknesses or signs of anxiety.  According to 
socially-anxious individuals, physical signs of anxiety represent incompetence and 
abnormality, and they overestimate the degree to which their anxiety symptoms are 
visible to others (Turk et al., 2000).  However, these high standards for social behavior 
are extremely difficult to achieve, resulting in frequent failure to meet these standards, 
which in turn reinforces their dysfunctional beliefs about their social inadequacy and 
maintains their anxiety (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
Because they believe that any social interaction is an evaluative situation, 
individuals with social anxiety are on constant alert for others who may evaluate them.  
In the presence of these evaluators, individuals with social anxiety feel that they must 
intently monitor themselves in order to ensure that they are not behaving or appearing in 
such a way that can result in negative evaluation and social rejection (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).   
Attention.  Clark and Wells (1995) hypothesized that when individuals with 




engage in self-focused attention, which involves closely monitoring internal information, 
such as physiology, posture, and tone of voice.  If they notice anything that may be 
perceived as unacceptable to others while monitoring themselves, their anxiety increases.  
For example, if an individual notices that his hand is trembling, he imagines what he 
looks like from the audience’s perspective.  The individual likely assumes that the 
audience can see that he is trembling and they find it unattractive or strange.  As a result, 
the individual’s anxiety increases and he may begin to tremble more, thus maintaining the 
cycle.  Ironically, this cycle can continue to the point where the distorted beliefs and 
assumptions may become accurate.  For example, the individual can become so nervous 
and upset about trembling, that he may start to tremble enough that others do notice.  To 
prevent this (and potential social rejection), the individual may abruptly excuse himself 
from the social encounter, leaving the others to wonder why he did so (and potentially 
leading to actual social rejection).  
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) agreed with Clark and Wells (1995) that individuals 
with social anxiety engage in self-focused attention while in evaluative situations.  
However, they argued that individuals with social anxiety only focus their attention on 
the internal features that are the most likely to be noticed and perceived as negative by 
others, which may vary depending on the current situation.  Then, in contrast to Clark and 
Wells (1995), they argued that individuals also focus their attention toward external cues 
for threat. 
 As a result, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) argued that individuals with social 
anxiety also are likely to have an attentional bias toward external stimuli.  They 




information than positive information because negative information is more threatening 
to them.  For example, if a dozen people in the crowd are smiling at the speaker and only 
one is frowning, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) suggested that individuals with social 
anxiety are more likely to notice and focus on the frowning person than the others 
because the frowning person represents a threat.   
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) suggested that attentional focus is cyclical.  When 
individuals with social anxiety perceive negative external cues, self-focused attention 
increases, which results in increased vigilance to internal anxious feelings.  Then, they 
shift their attention back to the audience in order to assess whether the audience can 
perceive their anxiety symptoms and social discomfort.  Whether such information exists 
or not, individuals with social anxiety will often interpret the audience’s behavior in such 
a way as to confirm their fears, thus continuing the cycle.   
Clark (2001) clarified the Clark and Wells (1995) hypothesis about the role of 
external attention by arguing that when engaging in self-focused attention, individuals 
with social anxiety do not ignore external information, but they significantly decrease 
their external attention.  Clark (2001) noted that whatever external information they do 
notice is likely to be biased toward negative information.  Therefore, the primary 
difference between the models is that Clark and Wells (1995) and Clark (2001) argued 
that attention was primarily self-focused, with some negative external information 
occasionally being processed, whereas Rapee and Heimberg (1997) argued that attention 
shifts back and forth from internal to external attention, and that these two processes may 




Research utilizing the emotional Stroop (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) 
and probe-detection (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) paradigms has found evidence 
of attentional biases toward external social stimuli.  The emotional Stroop is a procedure 
in which participants are shown a variety of words in a variety of colors and asked to 
name the color of each word.  Some of the words are neutral and others are emotionally 
charged or threat words (e.g., for social anxiety, “rejection,” “speech,” “fail,” “mock”).  
Individuals high in social anxiety symptoms (HSA) are consistently slower at naming the 
color of the social-threat words than individuals low in social anxiety symptoms (LSA) 
because the social-threat words engage their attention better than neutral words, and HSA 
individuals appear to have particular difficulty disengaging from the content of the word 
in order to complete the task (Amir et al., 1996; Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; 
Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Williams et al., 1996). 
In the probe-detection paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), participants 
are required to locate a visual stimulus that appears in place of one of two 
simultaneously-presented visual stimuli (e.g., words, images, or faces).  One of the 
stimuli is threatening and the other is neutral.  Theoretically, high-anxiety individuals 
should have faster reaction times to probes that appear in place of the threatening image, 
suggesting that they are hypervigilant to threat, as well as slower reaction times 
responding to the probe that appears in place of the neutral image, suggesting that they 
have difficulty disengaging from the visuospatial region previously occupied by the 
threatening image (MacLeod et al., 1986).  Studies have found evidence for both 




and difficulty disengaging from threat (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003; 
Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, de Houwer, 2004).  
More recent research has studied attentional biases for facial expressions, which 
are considered more ecologically-valid threat stimuli to individuals with social anxiety 
(Amir & Foa, 2001).  Studies using facial expression paradigms have typically found that 
HSA individuals tended to respond faster to probes that replaced threatening (e.g., angry) 
faces compared to neutral faces and LSA individuals (e.g., Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 
2004).  Dimberg (1997) found that, in general, participants reacted more negatively to 
angry facial expressions than to happy ones (as measured by facial electromyographic 
activity), and that individuals high in public speaking fear gave more pronounced 
negative reactions than the low-fear group.  Additionally, the high-fear group rated happy 
faces as less friendly and less happy than the low-fear group, which provides further 
evidence for interpretation biases in this population.  There is empirical support for both 
internal and external attentional biases during social threats, but few studies test the 
cognitive models directly by examining these processes simultaneously.   
The rare empirical attempts to simultaneously evaluate the internal/external 
attention hypotheses of both models have been inconclusive.  For the most part, most of 
the research has supported enhanced internal attention, but not enhanced external 
attention.  For example, Pozo, Carver, Wellens, and Scheier (1991) measured 
participants’  reactions to facial expression changes in interaction partners, and found that 
LSA individuals were equally as adept at noticing these changes as HSA individuals, 
suggesting that the HSA individuals did not have enhanced attention for the facial 




external attention is enhanced, it also does not support Clark and Wells’ (1995) assertion 
that external attention is reduced because there were no differences between the groups.  
Similarly, Schultz (2009) had HSA and LSA individuals give a speech to positive and 
negative confederate audiences, expecting that HSA individuals would report higher rates 
of negative self-focused cognitions and negative audience-focused cognitions than LSA 
individuals.  Again, the results did not support either model over the other.  HSA 
participants reported equal levels of audience-focused cognitions for negative and 
positive audiences, suggesting that the threatening stimulus of the negative audience did 
not enhance or reduce externally-focused attention.   
Mellings and Alden (2000) also tested both types of attentional focus, but in the 
context of a memory paradigm.  They instructed HSA and LSA individuals to interact 
with a confederate, and then they tested their memory for the interaction the next day.  
They found that socially-anxious individuals recalled significantly less external 
information (i.e., information about their partners and the setting) and recalled 
significantly more self-related information than the LSA participants.  Although this 
seems to support Clark and Wells (1995), it should be noted that memory biases for 
external information are different than attentional biases for external information.   
Schultz and Heimberg (2008) attempted to answer this question with a review of 
the available literature examining internal or external attention processes in social threat 
paradigms.  Clear conclusions could not be drawn from this review, mostly because 1) 
not enough studies examined internal and external attention simultaneously, and the ones 
that did had questionable methods and/or ecological validity, and 2) the results were 




socially-anxious individuals, which provided support for both models.  They also 
reported that some studies have found evidence for biased attending to external threat 
cues (supporting Rapee and Heimberg, 1997), whereas others have supported evidence 
for biased avoidance of external threat cues (contradicting Rapee and Heimberg, 1997).  
Cognitive models and subsequent research have clearly shown the importance of 
attentional biases in SAD, so further research needs to be done in order to better inform 
researchers about the role attention plays.  
Taken together, the research strongly supports that individuals with social anxiety 
display marked biases in their cognitive processing, which may interact with each other 
and influence anxious arousal and behavioral responding to maintain SAD.  However,  
the biased attention is only one step in a maladaptive cognitive cycle that maintains social 
anxiety symptoms.  Although individuals with social anxiety are attentive to threat, social 
stimuli are almost always ambiguous, so evaluating these stimuli requires a significant 
degree of interpretation.  However, as with attention, individuals with social anxiety 
show biases in this process.  
Interpretation biases.  Research supports that individuals with anxiety disorders, 
including SAD, disproportionately attribute negative interpretations to neutral social 
stimuli, exaggerate the consequences of mildly negative experiences, and overestimate 
the probability of negative events occurring (Amir & Foa, 2001; Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Voncken,  Bögels, & Peeters, 2007).  This bias appears to 
apply only to social situations (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000). 
Cognitive models (Clark and Wells, 1995; Rapee and Heimberg ,1997) 




has little evidence available to evaluate how the social event went.  As a result, the 
individual attempts to review the event in detail (a process called postevent processing), 
but this review is likely to be negatively biased, distorted, incomplete, and inaccurate.  
The individual most likely spent the duration of the social encounter engaging in 
catastrophic thinking (e.g., “they hate me,” “they can tell I’m nervous”) and feeling 
anxious and tense; as a result, the entire experience is recollected through a negative lens.  
Therefore, even if the experience was positive or neutral, social phobics add this 
experience to their mental list of past failures, providing themselves with more evidence 
of their lack of social prowess.  Similarly, Clark and Wells (1995) note research that 
shows that when given ambiguous social situations to evaluate, individuals with social 
anxiety are more likely than control participants to choose a negative interpretation of the 
event as opposed to a neutral interpretation.   
Amir and colleagues (1998) demonstrated this by providing socially-anxious, 
obsessive-compulsive, and nonanxious controls with a variety of ambiguous social 
scenarios and asking them to endorse one of three (negative, positive, or neutral) 
interpretations.  For example, one scenario stated “You see a group of friends having 
lunch [and] they stop talking when you approach” and participants chose between 1) 
“They are saying negative things about you,” 2) “They are just about to ask you to join 
them,” or 3) “They just ended their conversation” (p. 948).  They found that socially-
anxious individuals endorsed the negative interpretation at a higher rate than the other 
two groups, but this bias was only for social, self-referent situations.  
Stopa and Clark (2000) had participants read various social (e.g., “you host dinner 




“you receive a letter in the mail marked ‘urgent’”) scenarios that ended with “Why?”  
Participants were instructed to write an open-ended response to the scenario and then 
rank-order three experimenter-provided scenarios.  Results showed that HSA individuals 
produced more negative evaluations of the social situations than the high-anxious and 
nonanxious controls, and there were no differences between the groups for nonsocial 
situations.  They also found that HSA individuals evaluated mildly negative scenarios 
(e.g., “your friend appears disinterested in what you are saying”) more catastrophically 
(e.g., “I am a boring person”) than the control groups.  This study responded to a major 
criticism of prior interpretation bias research, which was that having participants select 
from experimenter-generated interpretations was not ecologically valid.  Stopa and Clark 
(2000) addressed this by having participants provide open-ended interpretations and 
select from researcher-generated interpretations, and the results showed biases for both 
types, which seems to lend support to both paradigms.  In a similar study, Vassilopoulos 
(2006) found that HSA individuals were more likely than LSA individuals to interpret 
mildly negative scenarios catastrophically.  Results also showed that HSA individuals 
were more likely than LSA individuals to discount the positive scenarios (e.g., by 
providing interpretations such as, “he does not like me, but he smiled at me to be polite”).  
Kanai, Sasagawa, Chen, Simada, and Sakano (2010) applied these ideas to a 
social interaction.  They used pilot studies to identify five behaviors that were rated as 
emotionally neutral and common (e.g., clearing one’s throat, scratching one’s head, etc.).  
They had confederates engage in these behaviors during an interaction with participants 




than the LSA individuals.  This study was particularly important at applying results of 
earlier, questionnaire-based studies to an actual social interaction.  
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) provided a similar theory of interpretation biases.  
They argued that HSA individuals display a response bias that disproportionately predicts 
a high probability of negative evaluation in social situations and severe consequences if 
negative evaluation occurs relative to nonanxious individuals.  In support of this, Foa, 
Franklin, Perry, and Herbert (1996) found that HSA participants rated negative social 
events as more likely to occur, and they overestimated the potential negative 
consequences of the negative event compared to LSA individuals.  Similarly, 
Vassilopoulos (2006) found that HSA individuals rated neutral/positive outcomes to 
ambiguous social events as less probable than LSA individuals.  
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) also suggested that the individual’s mental 
representation is susceptible to interpretation biases, especially when the individual is in a 
threatening situation and experiencing physiological symptoms.  In support of this, 
research has found that the socially-anxious individuals highly exaggerate how visible 
their physiological and/or anxiety symptoms are to other people, report higher use of 
anxious-behaviors, and provide lower ratings of their appearance (Rapee & Abbott, 2006; 
Vassilopoulos, 2005) 
The Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) models almost 
exclusively hypothesized about off-line interpretation biases, which are the explicit, 
retrospective interpretations of scenarios or behaviors that are discussed above.  
However, a more recent line of research is attempting to determine if interpretation biases 




presented.  On-line interpretation biases in SAD are typically measured by implicit 
cognitive tasks.  The assumption with these is that it takes individuals longer to respond 
to stimuli that do not match their automatic assumptions.  In other words, on-line 
interpretation biases in social anxiety are represented by slow response times to positive 
or neutral interpretations of social events presented during word tasks (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2000).  For example, Hirsch and Mathews (2000) had individuals with SAD 
and nonanxious individuals read vignettes that included word probes that were either 
positive or negative interpretations.  They found that socially-anxious participants could 
be differentiated from nonanxious controls by a lack of positive interpretation bias, but 
not by the presence of a negative interpretation bias.  The lack of positive interpretation 
bias has been demonstrated in one other study using a similar methodology (Moser, 
Hajcak, Huppert, Foa, & Simons, 2008), as well as in one study examining off-line 
interpretation biases (Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003).  
At this time, the majority of interpretation bias research examines off-line, 
negative interpretation biases, which appear to be consistently supported in the literature.  
Future research in this domain could focus more on on-line and positive interpretation 
biases, each of which can further inform theories of information processing. 
Memory biases. Based on the Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg 
(1997) models, it seems that memory biases would fit well into cognitive models of 
social anxiety.  As mentioned previously, a large body of literature has concluded that 
individuals with social anxiety are hypervigilant to social threat, so it would make sense 
that socially-threatening information would be more likely to be encoded into memory 




anxiety should be better and faster at retrieving social memories.  However, although the 
research on attentional and interpretation biases has consistently demonstrated biased 
information processing, research on memory biases has been riddled with inconsistencies 
in methods, paradigms, and results (Amir & Foa, 2001; Mitte, 2008; Morgan, 2010).   
 Rapee, McCallum, Melville, Ravenscroft, and Rodney (1994) used a variety of 
paradigms to test for memory biases in individuals with social anxiety.  The paradigms 
included recall of socially-threatening words (implicitly and explicitly), recall of negative 
feedback after a speech task, and recall of socially-threatening memories.  They found 
that HSA and LSA individuals recalled an equal number of social-threat-related stimuli in 
every paradigm, so they concluded that there was no evidence for memory biases in 
individuals with social anxiety.  Some studies have replicated these results (Becker, Roth, 
Andrich, & Margraf, 1999; Lundh & Öst, 1996), but others have found evidence that 
individuals with social anxiety have enhanced memory for facial expressions (Foa, 
Gilboa-Schechtman, Amir, & Freshman, 2000) and quicker retrieval of social memories 
(Wenzel & Cochran, 2006) relative to nonanxious controls, suggesting that differences in 
stimuli and paradigms may be responsible for differences in results.  
In a meta-analytic study of the relationship between anxiety disorders and 
memory biases, Coles and Heimberg (2002) concluded that the results of memory bias 
research in anxiety disorders appears to be very inconsistent.  The results are conflicting, 
even for studies using consistent paradigms and recruiting participants with consistent 
symptom profiles.  Coles and Heimberg (2002) suggested that memory biases may be 
specifically-related to some anxiety disorders and not others.  For example, memory 




compulsive disorder, but there was no evidence of a similar relationship in generalized 
anxiety disorder and social phobia.  Overall, Coles and Heimberg (2002) noted that the 
literature was limited and full of methodological inconsistencies, and many studies and/or 
paradigms had limited ecological validity. 
Amir and Foa (2001) performed a similar meta-analysis on memory research 
specific to social anxiety.  Specifically, Amir and Foa (2001) contended that attempting 
to study memory in SAD by testing participants’ memory of threatening words is not 
necessarily the most valid procedure for activating the mechanisms responsible for 
memory biases.  Instead, recent research has supported a memory bias for facial 
expressions, such that HSA individuals showed greater recall for faces than nonanxious 
controls, as well as a disproportionately high recall of negative faces compared to neutral 
faces (Foa, Gilboa-Schectman, Amir, & Freshman, 2000).  
Another way memory bias research in social anxiety could be improved is to 
increase the focus on autobiographical memory.  Autobiographical memory is a form of 
episodic memory which includes 1) memory for a particular episode/event, as well as 
cues memory for other information such as 2) knowledge about the particular time in 
one’s life that the event occurred, 3) memory of similar events, and/or 4) very vivid 
sensory information (Morgan, 2010).  A meta-analysis of autobiographical memory 
biases in social anxiety by Morgan (2010) concluded that the research supports that 
individuals with social anxiety show enhanced memory for threatening and highly 
emotional autobiographical memories.  Despite significant variability in methods, 
paradigms, and results, Morgan (2010) concluded that the autobiographical memories 




descriptions of anxiety symptoms, and less sensory information.  The latter finding 
appears to support Clark and Wells’ (1995) contention that self-focused attention is so 
dominant that external information, including sensory information, is not attended to.  
Despite the recent, promising research on autobiographical memory, the 
variability in methods and results leaves many questions unanswered.  Further research 
should continue to examine autobiographical and facial-expression memory instead of 
threat-word memory, and methods should attempt to be as theory-driven as possible.  
Safety behaviors.  As stated previously, when individuals with social anxiety feel 
nervous, they believe that others can perceive their nervousness as well.  Clark and Wells 
(1995) suggested that some individuals may engage in safety behaviors in order to 
counteract what they assume are visible signs of anxiety.  For example, a man who is 
sweating might attempt to cover sweaty spots on his clothes with his hands, or a woman 
with a shaky hand may try to hold an object tighter in order to keep from dropping it.  As 
a result, the individual is even more focused on his or her anxiety, and s/he is now 
drawing attention to it by engaging in behaviors that may not appear entirely natural.  
Therefore, these behaviors may increase the probability of the feared consequence.  On 
the other hand, if the feared consequence does not occur (which is a high-probability 
outcome, considering the feared consequence was based on distorted assumptions and 
beliefs), individuals with social anxiety may attribute their social “success” or “survival” 
to the safety behavior, and they may engage in that behavior in the future (Clark, 2001). 
 Research has found that individuals with social anxiety engage in such behaviors 
as reduced and quiet talking, avoidance of eye contact, emotional suppression, attempts 




(Cuming et al., 2009; Stevens et al., 2010).  These behaviors may interfere with social 
performance (Stevens et al., 2010), and others may rate the individual as unfriendly or 
arrogant (Alden & Wallace, 1995).  
Taylor and Alden (2011) assigned participants with SAD to either a safety 
behavior reduction exposure group (which received exposure therapy and safety behavior 
reduction training) or a control exposure group (which only received exposure therapy) 
prior to a social interaction with a stranger.  In the safety behavior reduction group 
(SBR), participants were given a rationale as to why they should decrease the use of 
safety behaviors that they endorsed using.  After the interaction, participants in the SBR 
group perceived that they had had a more positive interpersonal interaction than those in 
the control group. More importantly, their objective partners felt the same way.  The 
partners who interacted with the SBR group rated them as more interpersonally positive 
than the partners who interacted with participants in the control group.   
Taylor and Alden (2011) explained that this effect was mediated by a significant 
increase in social approach behavior.  In other words, the intentional decrease in safety 
behaviors led to an increase in social approach behaviors, which are associated with 
facilitating friendship growth in first encounters. These behaviors include appearing 
friendly, engaged, and interested, as well as talking openly about oneself, all of which are 
restricted in individuals with social anxiety (Alden & Taylor, 2010).  
Introduction to anticipatory processing.  Both models argued that individuals 
with social anxiety engage in various cognitive behaviors that overwhelm their 
attentional processes and bias their processing of information, and this biased information 




Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  This distorted view of the self is maladaptive, creating a 
cycle of dysfunctional thoughts and behaviors which maintain social anxiety symptoms 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  Most components of the Clark and 
Wells (1995) model have been either heavily (e.g., attentional and interpretation biases) 
or modestly (e.g., dysfunctional beliefs, safety behaviors, etc.) researched.  However, 
literature about a process called anticipatory processing, which is only mentioned in the 
Clark and Wells (1995) model, has only emerged very recently.  Clark and Wells (1995) 
theorized that this process may influence the individual’s attention and anxiety, and may 
lead to avoidance, which makes the absence of anticipatory processing research even 
more perplexing. 
Description of anticipatory processing.  Clark and Wells (1995) hypothesized 
that prior to a social situation, individuals with social anxiety engage in anticipatory 
processing, in which they review the potential social situation in detail, rehearse what 
they will say or do, imagine how they will look to others, imagine worst-case scenarios, 
and recall past social failures.  This anticipatory processing results in a considerable 
increase in anxiety, and they may decide to avoid the social event altogether.  As they are 
engaging in anticipatory processing, Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that their attention 
starts to shift inward, and by the time they are in the social situation, “[they are] likely to 
already be in a self-focused processing mode, to expect failure, and to be less likely to 
notice any signs of being accepted by other people” (p. 74).  In other words, Clark and 
Wells (1995) suggested that the anticipation period increases anxiety, activates 
dysfunctional assumptions (e.g., “they will be watching me intently,” “if I mess up, they 




excessively monitor themselves.  
The absence of research on anticipatory processing is particularly interesting 
given the potential causal and temporal importance of this process.  According to the 
Clark and Wells (1995) model, it appears that anticipatory processing is the beginning 
stage of the eventual anxiety cycle that surrounds a social event.  Anticipatory processing 
may even serve as the mechanism that activates processes such as increased anxiety, self-
focused attention, and cognitive biases.  However, much of the research on anticipatory 
processing has only studied anxiety as an outcome variable.  
Research on Anticipatory Processing in Social Anxiety Disorder 
As mentioned, there is a limited, but growing body of research examining the 
direct consequences of anticipatory processing.  Research on anticipatory processing 
should be differentiated from research that uses a social threat task to elicit anxiety or 
stress.  The latter research, although abundant, utilizes social fears, which are common, in 
order to measure stress or anxiety responses generally.  This is in contrast to anticipatory 
processing (and other social anxiety) research, which is interested in very specific 
processes likely unique to social anxiety that are hypothesized to maintain symptoms of 
SAD.  At this point, seven studies have examined anticipatory processing as described by 
adult social anxiety models, with a variety of methodologies and results.  
Mansell and Clark (1999) examined differences in memory biases between 
individuals who were threatened with a speech task and those who were not threatened.  
Participants high and low in social anxiety were tested on differences in recall for three 
types of stimuli: public self-referent (how someone else would describe you), private 




describe someone else).  The results showed that the HSA individuals who were 
threatened with (and therefore anticipated) the upcoming speech recalled fewer positive 
public self-referent words than the LSA participants.  These results suggested that those 
with high social anxiety have a bias against recalling positive words that others may use 
to describe them, but only when anticipating an upcoming social event.  This seems to 
support the notion that increases in anxiety tend to activate cognitive biases for 
individuals high in social anxiety symptoms.  
Brown and Stopa (2006) had participants high and low in social anxiety give a 
speech in front of a video camera.  Participants were told that the speech would be rated 
by psychologists.  After the first speech, they told participants that they would be doing a 
second speech, and were given ten minutes to anticipate the upcoming speech.  They 
concluded that HSA participants who engaged in anticipation experienced higher levels 
of anxiety and more negative images about the upcoming social event than LSA 
participants.  They also found that HSA individuals who anticipated used the observer 
perspective (seeing themselves from a third-person perspective) more often than when 
they did not anticipate and more often than LSA individuals.  Finally, they found that 
both groups rated their second speech, which was preceded by an anticipation period, as 
more positive than their first (unanticipated) speech, which seemed to suggest that 
anticipation led to a more positive social experience.  However, the researchers noted that 
these effects were possibly due to practice effects that were carrying over from the first 
speech.  Also, the participants were instructed to “prepare themselves mentally” for the 
speech, but given no instructions on how to do so.  Therefore, it is possible that the 




Because of these limitations, no firm conclusions should be drawn regarding those 
findings.  
Vassilopoulos (2004) created and psychometrically-evaluated a measure of 
anticipatory processing that was developed from the Clark and Wells (1995) model and 
studies of post-event rumination/post-event processing (Anticipatory Processing 
Questionnaire; Vassilopoulos, 2004).  There was a moderate correlation between 
anticipatory processing and social anxiety (r = .49, p < .001), which remained significant 
when controlling for depression and trait anxiety.  These results suggested that 
individuals with social anxiety have intrusive thoughts about an upcoming social 
situation in which they spend time and effort attempting to predict how others will react 
to them, and this process interferes with the individual’s concentration and increases the 
individual’s anxiety.  Although Grant and Beck (2010) did not explicitly study 
anticipatory processing in a social anxiety context, the results added valuable information 
to the study of anticipatory processing.  They examined the trajectory of rumination in 
undergraduate students following a midterm exam, which is considered to be a 
universally anxiety-provoking situation.  They found that those who engaged in 
anticipatory processing tended to have higher levels of rumination after the exam than 
those who did not anticipate, suggesting that anticipatory processing prolonged 
rumination.   
In other words, Grant and Beck (2010) found that anticipatory processing, a 
process hypothesized to maintain social anxiety, seems to interact with post-event 
rumination, which is another cognitive process that is hypothesized to maintain social 




Clark and Wells (1995) suggested a period of anticipatory processing occurs prior to the 
event and a period of post-event rumination occurs after the event.  The findings of Grant 
and Beck (2010) suggested that these processes may exacerbate each other to the point of 
maintaining an almost constant anxiety cycle.  Furthermore, Grant and Beck (2010) even 
found a spike in rumination at the last time point for those who anticipated, which the 
authors attributed to the upcoming announcement of the exam grades.  This supports the 
notion of an interrelation between pre-and post-event processing that may be almost 
continuously maintaining a high-anxiety cycle.  
Although Grant and Beck (2010) found evidence of a relationship between 
anticipatory processing and post-event rumination, Mellings and Alden (2000) did not.  
They had participants engage in a social interaction with a confederate, and then had 
them return a day later to engage in a second interaction.  Some of the participants were 
told that they would be engaging in the second interaction and that an audience would be 
rating their performance (anticipation condition), while others were only told that there 
was one more part of the study to complete (control condition).  They found that socially 
anxious participants engaged in more self-focused attention, had more negative self-
judgments, remembered more negative self-related information, remembered less 
information about their partner, and engaged in more post-event processing than control 
participants.  They also found that those who engaged in negative, self-focused attention 
tended to have higher rates of judgment biases, especially for the socially-anxious group.  
However, none of these findings were influenced by whether or not the participant 
engaged in anticipation prior to the second interaction.  It may have been beneficial to 




of) the second interaction.  The anticipatory processing process may not have been as 
effective in this case because the participants had just experienced a non-catastrophic 
social interaction that may have served as an exposure exercise that reduced apprehensive 
anxiety for the upcoming interaction.   
Hinrichsen and Clark (2003) “trained” participants to engage in anticipatory 
processing by instructing them to engage in cognitive behaviors that distinguished HSA 
from LSA individuals.  These behaviors included recalling past social failures, imagining 
the worst that could happen during the upcoming event, planning ways to escape or avoid 
the situation, imagining how the individual would appear to others, and planning and 
rehearsing conversations, (see Appendix B for the instructions used in Hinrichsen & 
Clark, 2003).  Overall, individuals who engaged in anticipatory processing experienced 
higher levels of anxiety prior to the speech, as well as higher peak anxiety during the 
speech than those who did not anticipate.  Interestingly, LSA individuals who were 
instructed to anticipate experienced the same level of anxiety as HSA individuals, 
suggesting that instructing nonclinical individuals to think like socially-phobic 
individuals can result in clinically elevated levels of social anxiety.  These results also 
suggested that the main difference between HSA and LSA individuals may not be the 
level of anxiety they experience during the social interaction, but instead may be the type 
of cognitive processes that automatically occur prior to the interaction.  
Vassilopoulos (2005) then examined the effects of anticipatory processing on 
memory and predictions about the individual’s behavior and appearance.  Researchers 
informed participants that they would be giving a speech to a video camera and then had 




anticipatory processing or a distraction task.  The anticipation group was informed that 
they would be given a speech and were instructed to predict how they will perform and 
remember similar situations that they have experienced in the past.  Results showed that 
HSA individuals who engaged in anticipatory processing had increased anxiety ratings 
throughout the study, whereas HSA individuals in the distraction condition experienced a 
slight decrease in anxiety.  Similarly, HSA individuals who engaged in anticipatory 
processing predicted that they displayed a greater number of negative social behaviors 
and a more negative appearance compared to the HSA individuals in the distraction 
group.   
However, there were no differences on any outcome variable between the LSA 
individuals who were in the anticipation or distraction groups, which did not replicate 
Hinrichsen and Clark’s (2003) results.  This may be because the anticipation instructions 
given by Vassilopoulos (2005) were less specific and neutral relative to those in the 
Hinrichsen and Clark (2003; Appendix B) study.  The instructions in the Vassilopoulos 
(2005) study only made participants aware of the upcoming social interaction, whereas 
the instructions in the Hinrichsen and Clark (2003) study instructed participants to think 
negatively about the upcoming (and past) social interactions.  Therefore, the LSA 
participants in the Vassilopoulos (2005) study most likely approached the social event 
neutrally, whereas the LSA individuals in the Hinrichsen and Clark (2003) study 
approached the social event similar to the ways that HSA do (e.g., imagining worst case 
scenarios, remembering past failures, etc.).  This distinction is important, and together, it 
appears that these two studies suggested that 1) when given similar instructions, HSA and 




anticipate in the same way as HSA individuals, LSA individuals are indistinguishable 
from HSA individuals with regards to anxiety level during a speech.  The results of these 
two studies are also important with regards to defining anticipatory processing within a 
social anxiety context.  For individuals with social anxiety, anticipatory processing is not 
simply a process of making predictions, preparing for various outcomes, and 
remembering similar scenarios from the past, but instead anticipatory processing appears 
to involve making negative and worst-case scenario predictions, preparing to avoid or 
escape the situation, and remembering (perhaps inaccurately) similar scenarios that went 
poorly.  It is these negative memories, predictions, and preparations that may maintain 
the social anxiety symptoms.  
Some studies have provided promising results, but more research must be done.  
Although the above studies show some consequences of anticipatory anxiety, the 
literature is limited enough that no strong conclusions can be drawn from the results.  A 
few studies consistently suggested that individuals who anticipate experience an increase 
in anxiety (Brown & Stopa, 2007; Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2005).  Is 
increased anxiety sufficient to cause a decrease in social performance and lead to social 
rejection?  Or are there other mechanisms that may result from anticipating that may have 
effects on social performance as well?   
Proposed Study 
The social anxiety literature has consistently found that HSA individuals 1) 
engage in more anticipatory processing (e.g., Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 
2004), and 2) display more cognitive biases than LSA individuals (Amir & Foa, 2001; 




between the anticipatory processing and cognitive biases.  Mellings and Alden (2000) 
potentially identified an interrelationship between the cognitive biases, as selective 
attention appeared to lead to biased judgments and recollections, but the relationship 
between anticipatory processing and these biases was nonexistent.  However, the 
anticipation paradigm in Mellings and Alden (2000) was different than paradigms used in 
studies that did find effects of anticipatory processing (e.g., Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; 
Vassiloupolos, 2005), suggesting that inconsistencies in methods may have contributed to 
inconsistencies in results.  Also, results have been based on a very limited body of 
research.  Grant and Beck (2010) found a relationship between anticipatory processing 
and post-event rumination, also suggesting an interrelationship between cognitive 
processes, as well as showing that there are potential consequences of anticipatory 
processing on at least one of these processes.  
Both cognitive models suggested that both self-focused attention and 
interpretation biases are responsible for maintaining social anxiety, but no research has 
examined whether or not anticipatory processing has any influence on either process.  
This is particularly surprising given the promising research in anticipatory processing, as 
well as the research that suggests that self-focused attention and interpretation biases can 
influence social performance (Furukawa et al., 2009; Johnson & Glass, 1989; Stevens et 
al., 2010) and increase behavioral avoidance (Lange et al., 2010).    
Clark and Wells (1995) appeared to suggest that anticipatory processing precedes 
the anxiety process that occurs prior to a social event, suggesting the possibility that 
anticipatory processing may have a role in “activating” cognitive biases that occur at the 




anticipatory processing.  This study is particularly interested in seeing if individuals who 
engage in anticipatory processing prior to a social situation will report greater self-
focused attention and/or report more biased interpretations of neutral social stimuli 
compared to individuals who do not engage in anticipation.  It also would be interesting 
to determine if HSA individuals are specifically susceptible to negative outcomes of 
anticipatory processing, or if the anticipation process is anxiety-provoking enough to 
activate cognitive biases in LSA individuals as well.   
To test the effects of anticipatory processing, HSA and LSA will be told that they 
will be engaging in a social interaction that will be evaluated by researchers.  They will 
then be instructed to engage in anticipatory processing based on the instructions used in 
Hinrichsen and Clark (2003; Appendix B; Appendix C) or they will engage in a 
distraction task.  It is hypothesized that HSA individuals who engage in anticipatory 
processing prior to a threatened social interaction will report the highest levels of 1) self-
focused attention, 2) negative interpretations of social scenarios, 3) avoidance, and 4) 
self-reported anxiety compared to the other groups.  LSA individuals who are instructed 
to anticipate and HSA individuals who are given a distraction task will show increased 





Anticipatory Processing Instructions (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003) 
I would like you to prepare for the upcoming speech by following the steps below. Please 
spend a few minutes on each of the steps and make sure you go through all of them in the 
order in which they are given. Please make sure you follow all of the steps. 
 
1.  Try to think of a particular social situation that you felt did not go well, where you felt 
uncomfortable or felt that others formed an unfavorable impression of you. 
 
2.  Try to imagine how you appeared in that situation: how do you think you looked to 
others? 
 
3.  Now, try to imagine how you are going to appear in the speech you are about to give. 
Try to think about how you will appear to others. What will they see? 
 
4.  Try to analyze in as much detail as possible what could go wrong while you are giving 
the speech. 
 
5.  Try to anticipate the worst thing that could happen while you are giving the speech. 
 
6.  Try to think about what you would have to do if you made a fool of yourself.  
 
If you have finished the task before the end of the 20-min period, please go back to the 








Anticipatory Processing Instructions for Current Study (based on Hinrichsen & Clark, 
2003) 
We want you to prepare for the upcoming social interaction by responding to the 
prompts on the next page. 
 
The following page will have a video which contains some thinking/imagining 
prompts.  As you read the prompts, use your imagination and concentration to focus 
your mind on each of the ideas.  Spend a few moments visualizing and concentrating 
on each item.  When you hear a tone, that means it is time to move on to the next 
prompt.  Later, we will ask you about your thoughts during this time. 
 
Try to think of a particular social situation that you felt did not go well, where you felt 
uncomfortable or felt that others formed an unfavorable impression of you. 
 
Try to imagine how you appeared in that situation: how do you think you looked to 
others? 
 
Now, try to imagine how you are going to appear during the upcoming social interaction. 
Try to think about how you will appear to the person you interact with and the 
researchers who view the video tape. What will they see? 
 
Try to analyze in as much detail as possible what could go wrong during the social 
interaction. 
 
Try to anticipate the worst thing that could happen during the social interaction. 
 








Distraction Instructions for Current Study (from Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) 
We want you to prepare for the upcoming social interaction by responding to the 
prompts on the next page. 
 
The following page will have a video which contains some thinking/imagining 
prompts.  As you read the prompts, use your imagination and concentration to focus 
your mind on each of the ideas.  Spend a few moments visualizing and concentrating 
on each item.  When you hear a tone, that means it is time to move on to the next 
prompt.  Later, we will ask you about your thoughts during this time. 
 
Think about/imagine the layout of a typical classroom 
Think about/imagine raindrops sliding down a windowpane 
Think about/imagine the shape of the continent Africa 
Think about/imagine a gas station on the side of a highway 
Think about/imagine clouds forming in the sky 











Sex:      F          M                 Age: ___________        
 
Ethnicity:    _____ Caucasian                  _____ Latino/Latina 
                     _____ African American     _____ Chicano/Chicana 
                     _____ Asian                         _____ Middle Eastern 
                     _____ Pacific Islander       _____ Native American 
_____ Other (Please specify: ______________) 
         
 
Place of Birth: _____________________    Primary Language: _________________ 
 
 
High School GPA: ______________          College GPA: ________________ 
 
 
Year in School:  ______ Freshman 
   ______ Sophomore 
   ______ Junior 
   ______ Senior 
   ______ Graduate student 
 
Mother’s      _____ high school graduate                     Father’s       _____ high school graduate            
Education:   _____ college graduate                            Education:   _____ college graduate 
                      _____ master’s degree                                                   _____ master’s degree 
                      _____ PhD, JD, MD                                                      _____ PhD, JD, MD 
                      _____ other                                                                    _____ other  
        (please specify: ____________)                                    (please specify: ____________) 
 
 
Approximate family income: 
     ____ < $10,000     ____ $10, 000-$20,000     ____ $21,000-$30,000 
     ____ $31,000-$40,000     ____ $41,000-$50,000     ____ $51,000-$60,000     ____ > $61,000 
 
Parents’ Marital Status:   _____ married          _____ separated          _____ divorced 







Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) 
For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the 
statement is characteristic or true of you.  The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me 3 = Very characteristic or true of me 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me 4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me 
 
 
1.  I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority 
(teacher, boss, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 4 
2.  I have difficulty making eye-contact with others. 0 1 2 3 4 
3.  I become tense if I have to talk about myself or my feelings. 0 1 2 3 4 
4.  I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the people I work 
with. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5.  I find it easy to make friends of my own age. 0 1 2 3 4 
6.  I tense-up if I meet an acquaintance on the street. 0 1 2 3 4 
7.  When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 0 1 2 3 4 
8.  I feel tense if I am alone with just one person. 0 1 2 3 4 
9.  I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 0 1 2 3 4 
10.  I have difficulty talking with other people. 0 1 2 3 4 
11.  I find it easy to think of things to talk about. 0 1 2 3 4 
12.  I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward. 0 1 2 3 4 
13.  I find it difficult to disagree with another’s point of view. 0 1 2 3 4 
14.  I have difficulty talking to an attractive person of the 
opposite sex. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15.  I find myself worrying that I won’t know what to say in 
social situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16.  I am nervous mixing with people I don’t know well. 0 1 2 3 4 
17.  I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when talking. 0 1 2 3 4 
18.  When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be 
ignored. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19.  I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 













Anticipatory Social Behaviours Questionnaire (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003) 
 
The following items ask you about behaviors, thoughts, and mental images that some 
people have prior to engaging in a social situation. Read each item below and select the 
option that best characterizes what you do prior to a social situation.  
 
 
1       2   3   4 
               Never         Always 
 
1. I think about similar situations in which I have failed in the past _____ 
 
2. I try to think of everything that could happen _____ 
 
3. I imagine the worst that could happen _____ 
 
4. I go over in detail what might happen _____ 
 
5. I try to picture how I will appear to others _____ 
 
6. I try to plan what I am going to say _____ 
 
7. I rehearse conversations in my mind _____ 
 
8. I remind myself of things I should not do _____ 
 
9. I think about ways in which I could put things right if I make a fool of myself _____ 
 
10. I think about ways in which I could avoid having to face the situation _____ 
 
11. I think about ways in which I could escape from the situation if it gets too embarrassing 
_____ 
 







Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) 
 
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved. Please tell me how often you 
have felt this way in the past week. 
 
 
DURING THE PAST WEEK 
 
 Rarely or none   Some or a little         Occasionally or a       Most or all 
    of the time       of the time    moderate amount of time       of the time 
(less than 1 day)              (1 – 2 days)                        (3 – 4 days)      (5 – 7 days) 
 
 0   1         2    3 
 
______  1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me. 
______  2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
______  3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or  
                  friends. 
______  4. I felt I was just as good as other people. 
______  5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
______  6. I felt depressed. 
______  7. I felt that everything I did was an effort. 
______  8. I felt hopeful about the future. 
______  9. I thought my life had been a failure. 
______ 10. I felt fearful. 
______ 11. My sleep was restless. 
______ 12. I was happy. 
______ 13. I talked less than usual. 
______ 14. I felt lonely. 
______ 15. People were unfriendly. 
______ 16. I enjoyed life. 
______ 17. I had crying spells. 
______ 18. I felt sad. 
______ 19. I felt that people dislike me. 







Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ;  Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) 
Enter the number that best describes how typical or characteristic each item is of you, 
putting the number next to the item. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 




 Very typical 
 
 
_________ 1. If I do not have enough time to do everything, I do not worry about it. 
_________ 2. My worries overwhelm me. 
_________ 3. I do not tend to worry about things. 
_________ 4. Many situations make me worry. 
_________ 5. I know I should not worry about things, but I just cannot help it. 
_________ 6. When I am under pressure, I worry a lot. 
_________ 7. I am always worrying about something. 
_________ 8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 
_________ 9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything else I have to 
do. 
_________ 10. I never worry about anything. 
_________ 11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I do not worry about 
it anymore.   
_________ 12. I have been a worrier all my life. 
_________ 13. I notice that I have been worrying about things. 
_________ 14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop. 
_________ 15. I worry all the time. 







Ruminative Response Scale (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; modified for 
current study) 
 
People think and do many different things after social situations.  Please read each of the 
items below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do 
each one following social situations.  Please indicate what you generally do, not what you 
think you should do. 
 
   1  2  3  4 
  Almost Never      Sometimes         Often        Almost Always 
 
1. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” ______ 
2. Analyze recent events to try to understand why you feel anxious during social 
situations ______ 
3. Think “Why do I always react this way?” ______ 
4. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way ______ 
5. Write down what you are thinking and analyze it ______ 
6. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better ______ 
7. Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” ______ 
8. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?” ______ 
9. Analyze your personality to try to understand why you feel anxious during social 
situations ______ 








Subjective Anxiety Level, Pre-Manipulation 
 
 
On a scale of 0 – 100, what would you rate your current anxiety ________ 








You just finished watching a video with thinking prompts.  




2.  What percentage (0% - 100%) of the time period allotted did you spend thinking about the 
prompts on the video as instructed?  (for example: 0% = did not spend any time thinking 
about the prompts, 50% = spent half of the time thinking about the prompts, 100% = spent 
the entire time thinking about the prompts)   ________% 
 
3.  What percentage (0% - 100%)of the time period did you spend thinking about the upcoming 
social interaction?   (for example, 0% = spent no time thinking about the social interaction, 
50% = spent half of the time thinking about the social interaction, 100% = spent the entire 
time thinking about the social interaction) ________% 
 
4. In your day-to-day life, how often to you spend time thinking about/imagining the things you 
were asked to think about (or imagine) in the video.  Circle a number below.  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Never     Sometimes    Many times 
               a day 
 
5. When reading and thinking about the on-screen prompts, how vivid was the imagery 
you were experiencing? Circle the number that corresponds to the images you may have 
been seeing in your mind.          RATING 
 
No image present at all       1 
So vague and dim as to be hardly discernible    2 
Vague and dim        3 
Not clear or vivid, but recognizable      4 
Moderately clear and vivid       5 
Very clear and comparable in vividness to the actual experience  6 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as the actual experience    7 
 
  






Subjective Anxiety and Behavioral Avoidance Measures 
Anxiety  
On a scale of 0 – 100, what would you rate your current anxiety ________ 






Please circle a number to answer each question.  
 
1) If given the opportunity to do additional questionnaires instead of the 
interaction, I would consider choosing to complete the questionnaires  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Definitely Maybe    Definitely 
No Yes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   
2) If given the opportunity to skip the interaction, but only get 1 SONA credit 
instead of 2, I would consider skipping the social interaction 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Definitely Maybe    Definitely 
No Yes  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3) How much are you looking forward to the interaction?   
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
I do not     I don’t    I want to 
want to      care either   do it / I’m 






Focus of Attention Questionnaire (Woody, 1996) 
 
While speaking some people focus on exactly what they are doing, while others find 
themselves focusing on other things such as feelings in their body, or objects in the room. 
We’re interested in what you are focusing on right now, as you wait for the social 
interaction to begin. Please read the items below and indicate what you are 
concentrating on and thinking about. 
 
Please use the following rating scale: 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
      Not at all        Somewhat      Moderately          A lot       Totally 
    
 ______ 1. I am focusing on the other person’s appearance or dress 
 
 ______ 2. I am focusing on the features or conditions of the physical surroundings (e.g., 
appearance, temperature) 
 
 ______ 3. I am focusing on what I should say or do during the social interaction  
 
 ______ 4. I am focusing on the impression I am going to make on my partner and/or the 
researchers 
 
 ______ 5. I am focusing on how my interaction partner might feel about himself/herself 
 
 ______ 6. I am focusing on what I will think of my interaction partner and/or what I think about 
the researchers 
 
 ______ 7. I am focusing on my level of anxiety 
 
 ______ 8. I am focusing on what the researchers are saying/doing 
 
 ______ 9. I am focusing on my internal bodily reactions (e.g., heart rate, sweating) 
 







Self Reported Measure of Interpretation Biases (Huppert et al., 2007) 
 
As you read each sentence, imagine yourself in the scene. Please rate on a 0-10 scale how 
likely each sentence would apply to you. 
 
     0       2      4     6       8             10 
Not at all unlikely possibly likely         very likely          definitely  
 
1. As you finish your performance, you see that the audience thinks you are fantastic. 
2. Someone looks at you standing in the elevator because they think you look weird 
3. As you are riding on the train, the person next to you looks at you because you are 
smiling 
4.  You walk into a party and someone looks in your direction because you are friendly 
5. Your supervisor calls you into her office to tell you that you did something 
impressive 
6. When you ask someone to be quiet in a movie theater, people think you are rude  
7. Your colleague attributes a mistake to you and you do not confront him because you 
are easygoing 
8.   Someone is looking at you while you are typing an email because you are struggling 
9.  As you are delivering a joke in your presentation, your peers laugh because they think 
that you are funny 
10. As you are jogging in the park, you feel that people think that you look silly 
11. While you are making a speech at your relative’s wedding, you look foolish 
12. You make a joke at a party and then find yourself thinking about it because you 
thought you were amusing 
13. As you speak to the person standing next to you, they look at you in a way that 
suggests that you are boring 
14. After you buy lunch, you drop a bag of chips in front of everyone, which makes you 
feel generous 
15. Someone looks at you standing in the elevator because they think you look attractive  
16. Someone is looking at you while you are typing an email because you are fast 
17. While you are delivering a speech, you notice that your voice sounds weak 
18. While you are talking, the store clerk thinks that you are stupid 
19. While you are delivering a speech, you notice that your voice sounds enthusiastic 
20. As you finish your performance, you see that the audience thinks you are horrible. 
21. As you are jogging in the park, you feel that people think that you look confident 
22. As you speak to the person standing next to you, they look at you in a way that 
suggests that you are smart 
23. As you are delivering a joke in your presentation, your peers laugh because they think 
that you are awkward 
24. When you ask someone to be quiet in a movie theater, people think you are assertive 





26. You walk into a party and someone looks in your direction because you are crazy  
27. Your supervisor calls you into her office to tell you that you did something awful 
28. You make a joke at a party and then find yourself thinking about it because you 
thought you were inappropriate 
29. After you buy lunch, you drop a bag of chips in front of everyone, which makes you 
feel clumsy  
30. While you are talking, the store clerk thinks that you are likeable 
31. While you are making a speech at your relative’s wedding, you look composed 
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